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NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI)
• SLI initiated under NASA Research
Announcement (NRA) 8-30
• Strategic Objectives
– Make spaceflight safer (1 in 10000 mission LOV)
– Make spaceflight cheaper ($1000/lb payload)
• Two prototype LOX/LH2 engine systems
funded under Cycle-1 of NRA8-30
– COBRA (Pratt & Whitney / Aerojet)
– RS-83 (Rocketdyne)
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LOX/LH2 Engines Developed for SLI
COBRA
RS-83
SSME
Both SLI LOX/LH2 Engines
benefited from experience
gained from SSME +25-year
operational history
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Operational Issues
• In order to achieve the SLI goal of economic
access to space, a number of propulsion
system operational concerns were identified
from SSME experience to be addressed
through pre-emptive design
• Lengthy post-flight turnaround interval
• Labor/time-intensive maintenance operations
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RLV Turnaround Time is Critical
Time on the
ground represents
lost revenue – which
impacts the economic
viability of the RLV
system.
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Post-Flight Turnaround Concerns
• Engine Drying
– A necessary but lengthy part of turnaround operations.  Offers
significant time savings if mitigated early in the design phase.
• Inspections
– Typically conducted to mitigate technical risk areas in the
engine.  Can be reduced by designing out risk areas or utilizing
alternate mitigation approaches.
• Engine vs. Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) Replacement
– An LRU philosophy should be established early in the design
phase to permit components with a high incidence of
replacement to be designed as LRUs.  Other non-LRU
components would require engine removal for depot-level
procedures if they required replacement.
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Engine vs. LRU Replacement
Figure 4: SSME Hardware Replacements for Life & Cause
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SSME Hardware Replacements for Life & Cause
Development of an
Line Replaceable
Unit (LRU)
philosophy should
be done early in the
engine design and
should take into
account components
that have a high rate
of replacement
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LRU Design Considerations
• Fasteners
– Avoid use of time-intensive anti-rotation devices (i.e.,
lockwire) by using alternatives such as self-locking nuts or
torque-stripe.
– Consider alternate fasteners or latching mechanisms when
possible.
• Common Tools
– Encourage limiting the number of tools required to
conduct engine maintenance operations.
• Shallow Engine Layout
– Organize “one-deep” LRU placement to permit rapid
R&R without disturbing other components
• Advanced Interface Design
– Minimize flange leakage potential and permit larger
margin for misalignment.
– Enable rapid interface mount/dismount.
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Useful Tools and Improvement Areas
• REIMR Study
– Reviewed other engine histories to determine “Fundamental
Root Causes” of problems and how they can be avoided in
the future.
• Process FMEA (P-FMEA)
– Identify critical and/or vulnerable processes in the
manufacturing and maintenance elements and how to
reinforce to prevent flaw infiltration.
– The P-FMEA is particularly applicable to components with
no/few moving parts (i.e., combustion devices), where
failure modes can be introduced through process escapes
during manufacture.
• Periodic Maintenance Schedule Evaluation
– Review rationale for specific maintenance operations to
enable elimination of those that are invalid or outdated.
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Useful Tools and Improvement Areas (cont’d)
• Minimization of Flight Sensor Suite
– Reduce required number of sensors by thorough
characterization of engine internal environment during
development by test.
– Utilize multiplexed sensors to sense multiple measurands
through one sensor port.
• Improved Sensor Reliability / Survivability
– The high number of sensor replacements on SSME indicate
a need for sensor design improvements to better tolerate the
extreme engine environment and all operational phases.
– This is also applicable to connectors and wiring harnesses.
• EHMS-supported Maintenance Scheduling
– Integrate algorithms into EHMS logic to support scheduling
of turnaround maintenance operations while the vehicle is
still in orbit.
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Conclusion
• In Fall 2002, SLI LOX/LH2 engine development
was suspended due to reorientation of immediate
risk reduction priorities to LOX/kerosene.
– Both COBRA and RS-83 were proceeding on schedule
and on budget.
• Significant improvements in engine operational
efficiency were being incorporated into both
engine designs when work was suspended.
• Both showed progress toward achieving SLI
strategic goals of increased safety and reliability,
and reduced operational cost.
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Abstract 
The NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI) was initiated in early 2001 to conduct technology development and to 
reduce the business and technical risk associated with developing the next-generation reusable launch system.  In the 
field of main propulsion, two LOX/LH2 rocket engine systems, the Pratt & Whitney / Aerojet Joint Venture (JV) 
COBRA and the Rocketdyne RS-83, were funded to develop a safe, economical, and reusable propulsion system.  
Given that a large-thrust reusable rocket engine program had not been started in the U.S. since 1971, with the Space 
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), this provided an opportunity to build on the experience developed on the SSME 
system, while exploiting advances in technology that had occurred in the intervening 30 years.  One facet of engine 
development that was identified as being especially vital in order to produce an optimal system was in the areas of 
operability and maintainability.  In order to achieve the high levels of performance required by the Space Shuttle, 
the SSME system is highly complex with very tight tolerances and detailed requirements.  Over the lifetime of the 
SSME program, the engine has required a high level of manpower to support the performance of inspections, 
maintenance (scheduled and unscheduled) and operations (prelaunch and post-flight).  As a consequence, the labor-
intensive needs of the SSME provide a significant impact to the overall cost efficiency of the Space Transportation 
System (STS).  One of the strategic goals of the SLI is to reduce cost by requiring the engine(s) to be easier (i.e. less 
expensive) to operate and maintain.  The most effective means of accomplishing this goal is to infuse the operability 
and maintainability features into the engine design from the start.  This paper discusses some of the operational 
issues relevant to a reusable LOX/LH2 main engine, and the means by which their impact is mitigated in the design 
phase.  
1. Introduction 
1.1 The Space Launch Initiative 
The NASA SLI program was initiated under 
NASA Research Agreement (NRA) 8-30 to begin 
development of a space launch system that would 
be significantly safer and more economical to 
operate than current launch systems.  SLI was 
identified as part of the Integrated Space 
Transportation Plan (ISTP) and followed on the 
NRA8-27 study to define an optimal roadmap that 
would produce a 2nd Generation Reusable Launch 
Vehicle (2GRLV).  The objective of the NRA8-27 
study was to identify risk reduction areas and was 
applicable to several 2GRLV architectures by 
performing cycle analyses and trade studies on 
applicable propulsion systems.  Risk reduction 
activities were then identified to mature the 
technologies and engine cycles to production 
status.  Other elements of the ISTP identified at 
that time included upgrades for safety of NASA’s 
first generation RLV, the space shuttle, and 
technologies for third and fourth generation 
transportation systems. 
The 2GRLV program was to build on NASA’s 
then-current programs (e.g., X-33, X-34 and X-37) 
— testing new materials, structures, propulsion, 
software, and other technologies needed to meet 
the program’s goals of significantly increasing 
safety to a 1 in 10,000 chance of loss of life and 
reducing payload launch costs from $10,000 per 
pound today to $1,000 per pound. 
The scope of NRA8-30 covered more than just the 
propulsion facet of space transportation.  The ten 
technology areas (TAs) worked on all elements of 
the next manned space launch infrastructure.  In 
addition, NRA8-30 was separated into multiple 
cycles and phases to permit management 
flexibility.  Cycle-1 would focus on initial 
prototype development and risk reduction, with 
Cycle-2 culminating in the demonstration by test 
of the prototype engine.  Phase-2 of the SLI 
program would build on the foundation laid by the 
prototype engine project by proceeding with the 
design, development, test, and deployment of the 
human-rated full-scale development (FSD) flight 
engine. 
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Figure 1: SSME 
Under Cycle-1 of the 2GRLV program, two 
prototype LOX/LH2 main engines were 
selected for development to reduce technical 
risks: the COBRA engine by the Joint Venture 
(JV) of Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and Aerojet, 
and the RS-83 by Rocketdyne.   
 
1.2 The SSME 
Rocketdyne initiated the development of the 
SSME in 1971 under contract to NASA to provide 
the main propulsion for the Space Shuttle.  Engine 
testing started in May 1975 and was first flown on 
12 April 1981 (STS-1).  Thirty years, a few 
thousand tests, over a hundred flights, and one 
million seconds of operation later, the SSME is 
still being safely operated as the STS main 
propulsion system. [1] 
The SSME (Figure 1) is a high-performance 490 
Klbf LOX/LH2 rocket engine and is the first large-
thrust engine ever developed to be reusable 
beyond that typically associated with an 
expendable engine life cycle (e.g. a few 
acceptance or calibration tests followed by the 
mission operation).  It was designed to be reusable 
with the intent of making access to space more 
economical than that experienced in previous 
manned space programs.  While the engine has 
succeeded in being capable of multiple uses, the 
cost benefit was less than envisioned.  This was in 
part due to the increasing operational costs 
required to maintain the engine in order for it to 
operate safely and reliably. 
Before and after each flight, the SSME is 
subjected to extensive external and internal 
inspections, as well as an exhaustive battery of 
maintenance procedures.  In addition, any 
nonconformances, irregularities, or discrepancies 
in the engine or its constituent components are 
meticulously documented and tracked.  These 
operational constraints require a significant level 
of skilled manpower to support continued 
operation of the engine.  By comparison, the non-
recurring cost of manufacturing the engine is of 
less concern than the recurring operational cost. 
SLI is oriented to utilize the operational expertise 
gained from the SSME to identify areas of focus to 
optimize the engine design to operate safely and 
reliably, while requiring labor to maintain and 
operate it. 
1.3 The COBRA Engine 
The Co-Optimized Booster for Reusable 
Application (COBRA) engine (Figure 2) is a 
reusable, LOX/LH2 600 Klbf class engine system 
utilizing the Single Burner Fuel-Rich Staged 
Combustion (SBFRSC) power cycle set up around 
the upgraded SSME ATD high-pressure 
turbomachinery.  The SBFRSC cycle reduces the 
potential for oxygen-rich failure modes inherent in 
the dual-burner cycle, thus increasing engine 
reliability and safety.  The hot combustion gases 
from the preburner drive both the hydrogen and 
LOX turbines in parallel before entering main 
chamber.  This design reduces the turbine 
temperature, increasing engine life.  In addition, 
the use of a single “liquid-liquid” preburner means 
that the high transient turbine temperatures seen 
during engine start in the dual-burner staged 
combustion cycle are eliminated.  Additionally, 
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Figure 2: COBRA
Figure 3: RS-83 
the fuel and LOX turbine temperatures are 
essentially “averaged” in the single preburner 
system, allowing the peak temperature in the 
system to stay at a more benign level.  The 
Russian RD-0120 engine also uses this cycle, 
though with an integrated single-shaft LOX and 
fuel turbopump.  
The COBRA engine system was selected for 
development under the Cycle-1 of the NRA8-30 
SLI program under contract NAS8-01108.  The 
genesis of the COBRA engine system originated 
during the development of the P&W XLR129 
engine for the USAF in the early 1970’s.  The 
system utilized a highly integrated “powerduct” 
arrangement, with the separate turbopumps 
mounted in a close-coupled configuration with the 
single fuel-rich preburner to a double-walled hot 
gas duct.   
1.4 The RS-83 Engine 
The RS-83 engine (Figure 3) is a reusable, 
LOX/LH2 750 Klbf class engine system utilizing 
the SBFRSC power cycle with the main 
turbopumps arranged in series as compared to the 
parallel configuration used by the COBRA system.  
The RS-83 is a clean sheet design built on 
experience gained from the lengthy history of 
producing the SSME.  Its development relies on 
advanced integration design tools and more 
rigorous design optimization in a quicker design 
cycle.  Risk reduction activities have included the 
development of advanced fabrication processes 
that result in more consistent material properties 
and shorter production times.  The RS-83 is 
similar to the COBRA system in that it decouples 
the fuel flow to the preburner from the coolant 
flow to the nozzle and main combustion chamber, 
promising a smoother start transient over that of 
the SSME. 
The RS-83 engine system was selected for 
development under the Cycle-1 of the NRA8-30 
SLI program.  
2. Operational Issues 
The following is a discussion of some of the 
operational issues associated with a LOX/LH2 
engine and some of the means to be considered on 
how they may be mitigated by pre-emptive design. 
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2.1 Post-flight Turnaround 
The economic viability of a reusable launch 
system is partially dependent on the ability to 
support a high launch rate.  Like commercial 
aircraft, time on the ground represents lost 
revenue.  From the time when the vehicle rolls to a 
stop and support personnel are allowed access to 
it, the vehicle and its subsystems are in a 
maintenance pipeline to prepare it for the next 
launch.  Minimizing the post-flight turnaround 
maintenance requirements is a key objective of the 
SLI program in its pursuit of developing a safe and 
reliable propulsion system that is less operations 
intensive than previous systems. 
One focus is to identify what maintenance 
operations are the most time/labor intensive and 
then either design out the need for doing the 
operation or develop a means of using existing or 
modified data (instrumentation) to eliminate the 
need.  One example is the use of a high-fidelity 
turbopump speed sensor to evaluate the pump 
speed decay at engine shutdown to eliminate rotor 
torque checks. 
2.1.1 Engine Drying 
During engine operation, the combustion of LOX 
and LH2 produces steam, which is invasive 
throughout the hot gas system of the engine.  The 
steam also permeates into the turbomachinery, 
where it condenses and collects as water.  It has 
been described that “about a cup” of water is 
drained from the SSME HPOTP following a 
nominal duration (hotfire) operation. 
Regardless of the volume, the presence of water or 
humidity in the engine is unacceptable and must 
be thoroughly removed prior to its next operation.  
Engine drying is generally a lengthy process 
requiring a heated gaseous nitrogen (GN2) purge 
through the engine.  On the SSME, a drying purge 
is connected to the engines shortly after the orbiter 
lands. 
While the need to dry the engine after operation 
cannot be eliminated, the amount of time required 
to complete it may be reduced.  This can be 
accomplished by minimizing the volumes where 
the water is known to collect, making it more 
difficult for steam to invade into areas where it 
could condense, or designing the volumes to 
permit them to be easily drained.  Another means 
of saving time would more efficient positioning 
and routing of purge and drains, and to have quick 
disconnects (QDs) in key locations to permit 
purges or drains to be easily 
connected/reconnected. 
2.1.2 Inspections 
In a perfect world, the engine should never require 
inspections.  Inspections are generally conducted 
to verify the physical integrity of risk areas on the 
engine and can be separated into external and 
internal types.  With few exceptions, inspections 
are usually visual, using the “Eyeball, Mark-1” as 
the primary instrument.  External inspections are 
less problematic than internal ones, because they 
do not require the engine to be breeched.  
Performing an internal inspection on the engine 
requires the opening of flanges or other 
component interfaces, or the opening of ports.  An 
internal inspection may be regarded in the same 
sense as “exploratory surgery” would be regarded 
on a medical patient – there is always a risk of a 
“post-operative infection” manifesting itself 
afterwards.  This is generally in the form of FOD 
(Foreign Object Debris) contamination being 
introduced into the engine (i.e. LOX tape, cotton 
swabs, rags, safety wire, nuts, bolts, etc.), which 
has been known to occur.  The following are some 
means by which inspections can be reduced: [2] 
• Do concurrent engineering, i.e., design and 
manufacturing engineers work to together to 
have parts and assemblies that are simple, easy 
to make, low cost and do not require post 
flight inspection. 
The use of concurrent engineering can be 
further utilized on a number of other 
crosscutting development applications.  The 
expertise provided by the engine maintenance 
technicians should not go unexploited.  They 
should be recruited into the engine and 
component design teams to provide valuable 
maintainability insight. 
• Eliminate welds by using castings (welds 
often require inspection to identify crack 
initiation / propagation).  If they cannot be 
eliminated, locate them where they can be 
easily inspected, on both sides if possible. 
• Eliminate as many inspection points as is 
possible make those required easy to do by 
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Figure 4: SSME Hardware Replacements for Life & Cause
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placing inspection ports in locations that are 
easy to access. 
• Eliminate fracture critical areas by using 
generous radius in all applications (i.e., HPF 
ducts, turbine housings, internal ties on LPF 
ducts, etc.). 
• Develop techniques for performing non-
intrusive inspections.   
• Eliminate the need for protective coating 
materials.   
• Characterize the internal environment of the 
engine as fully as possible and as early as 
possible during development.  Do this by 
actual test of a highly instrumented engine to 
develop and verify internal models.  This is 
useful in identifying problem areas and 
correcting them by pre-emptive design early in 
the design cycle, rather than later mitigating 
the flight risk by the implementation of a 
more-expensive maintenance “band-aid” that 
has to be added on to the post-flight 
turnaround procedures.  The lack of thorough 
environment characterization is often 
mitigated later by limiting engine life to 
compensate for the lack of design margin. 
2.1.3 Engine vs. LRU Replacement 
A Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) philosophy 
should be established early in the engine 
development that identifies components to be 
replaced on the engine while it is on the vehicle.  
Any other components not identified as LRUs 
would necessitate engine removal if replacement 
became necessary.  In order to reduce the impact 
to post-flight turnaround time, the engine and all 
identified LRUs would require design and 
development to be easily and quickly replaced.  
One way to optimally develop this philosophy 
would be to identify those components that have a 
high incidence of replacement for cause, and for 
life related.  An inventory was conducted by 
Rocketdyne on the SSME to catalog all the 
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hardware replacements that had occurred on the 
SSME during post-flight operations [3].  This 
replacement inventory was evaluated to show 
those components that had the highest rate of 
replacement (Figure 4).  The causes of 
replacement included: 
• Latent defects. 
• Flight, checkout, or suspect anomalies 
(includes NASA- or Rocketdyne-directed 
removals). 
• Damage incurred during turnaround 
operations. 
• Operational/life limits 
2.2 Engine or LRU Replacement 
 If it becomes necessary to remove and replace the 
engine or a LRU part, the ability to do this quickly 
is important in order to reduce its impact on the 
post-flight turnaround schedule.  The engine and 
all identified LRUs should utilize design attributes 
that permit this to be realized. 
2.2.1 Fasteners 
Simplification of fasteners and latching devices 
would be useful in designing expeditious removal 
features into the engine and LRU component 
interfaces.  Timesaving anti-rotation alternatives to 
the use of lock-wire should be considered 
whenever possible and can include self-locking 
nuts, washers with locking tabs, and torque-stripe 
compound.  One example that would save many 
hours of turnaround time on the Space Shuttle 
orbiter is the simplification of the fasteners used 
on the heat shields enclosing the SSMEs, which 
consist of several hundred bolts and require 
approximately eight hours each to remove in order 
to permit access to the engines. 
2.2.2 Common Tools 
In the same context as the simplification of 
fasteners and latching mechanisms, the additional 
simplification and standardization of tools 
required to perform maintenance operations can 
also result in a benefit to the time required to 
perform post-flight turnaround.  The requirements 
for complex or a large number of tools should be 
avoided. 
2.2.3 Shallow Engine Layout 
One guideline in the development of the LRU 
philosophy is to encourage “one-deep” or a 
“shallow” engine layout that would permit the 
removal of the LRU without having to previously 
remove any other component.  By design, parts 
identified for high instances of maintenance or 
removal are located at easily accessible locations 
in the engine layout. If a component is identified 
as needing to be replaced and can only be done so 
by the prior removal of one or more other 
components, then the cost (in turnaournd time) of 
on-site removal and replacement (R&R) may be 
excessive and the engine should be removed for 
depot-level maintenance activities. 
2.2.4 Advanced Interface Design 
Whenever an interface is disturbed, it must 
undergo a series of leak-checks and inspections to 
verify the interface seal integrity is acceptable.  
Another liability to be considered when a 
component interface is restored following an LRU 
replacement is the small misalignment tolerance 
allowed to prevent seal leakage or the formation of 
stress concentrations.  The development of 
advanced interfaces (e.g., spherical flanges) that 
reduce the potential for seal leaks and permits a 
larger range of misalignment would provide a 
benefit in LRU replacement times.  Development 
of an operationally efficient vehicle-to-engine 
interface can decrease maintenance operations and 
engine R&R time. Design considerations may 
include: location, number and grouping of 
interfaces, as well as possible use of automation 
and innovative use of tooling, ground support 
equipment (GSE), and infrastructure.   
3. Useful Engine Development Tools & 
Techniques 
In response to some of the operational issues 
identified during the SLI program, tools and 
techniques have been developed to mitigate the 
technical risk presented by them.  In order to 
develop the best solutions the design process must 
consider all phases of handling and operations of 
the engine, from “cradle-to-grave” (including 
assembly, test and flight cycles, to final 
disassembly and deactivation).   
  7
3.1 REIMR Study 
At the initiation of SLI, MSFC conducted a 
detailed study of development and operational 
issues associated with liquid propellant rocket 
engines.  This included many of the “lessons 
learned” that had been documented for most of the 
large-thrust rocket engines developed in the 
United States (i.e. F-1, J-2, and SSME).  Emphasis 
was placed on determining common themes in 
issues or problem areas in all phases of engine 
design, development, manufacture and operation.  
The intent was to provide the results of this study 
to the different engine development teams (i.e. 
COBRA and RS-83) to assist them in avoid the 
development “speed-bumps” that had been 
encountered previously. 
The key difference that separated this study, 
known as REIMR (Rocket Engine Issue 
Mitigation Resource), from many previous 
“lessons learned” studies was that it not only 
focused on the problem/event and the immediate 
primary cause of it, but also the “fundamental root 
cause” that had allowed it to occur and how it 
could be avoided/mitigated in future engine 
programs.  The Fundamental Root Causes (FRCs) 
identified were: 
• Inadequate understanding of the engine 
environment. 
• Inadequate systems engineering and 
integration design trades. 
• Inadequate resources. 
• Overestimation of technology base. 
• Immature mission/vehicle design requirements 
imposed unnecessary engine requirements. 
• Inadequate understanding of manufacturing 
environments and process variability. 
• Inadequate understanding of material 
properties. 
• Inadequate design margins. 
• Inadequate quality processes. 
• Inadequate or loosely worded requirements or 
specifications. 
• High performance requirements (ISP, thrust-to-
weight, etc.) drove design to be very sensitive 
to all design and operations parameters. 
3.2 Process FMEA 
The function of process FMEA (P-FMEA) is to 
evaluate critical manufacturing and maintenance 
processes and procedures to identify the likelihood 
and consequences of an escape.  The P-FMEA is 
useful for mitigating manufacturing and 
maintenance risks during the preliminary and 
design phases.  It also is useful in mitigating one 
of the FRCs identified in the REIMR study (e.g. 
“Inadequate understanding of manufacturing 
environments and process variability.”). 
3.3 Periodic Maintenance Schedule 
Evaluation 
In the development of the post-flight maintenance 
schedule, it is obviously important to document 
the rationale for conducting each maintenance 
operation.  This permits periodic evaluation of the 
schedule to eliminate those activities that no 
longer have a valid rationale for performing.  
3.4 Minimization of Flight Sensors 
Like inspections, a rocket engine in a perfect 
world is one that doesn’t need sensors.  Emphasis 
should be made to minimize the number of 
intrusive sensors required by the flight engine.  A 
high number of sensor ports can result in a 
degradation of reliability by a higher number of 
potential leak locations, sources of FOD, and 
sensors that can fail.  Sufficient instrumentation 
should be utilized during engine development to 
fully characterize the internal environment and 
model the relationships between the flight sensors 
and the engine operating condition.  This should 
further reduce the suite of flight instrumentation. 
Another means of reducing the number of 
intrusive instrumentation ports penetrating the 
engine is through the use of multiplexed sensors 
that can sense multiple measurands (i.e., 
temperature, pressure, vibration) through one port.   
3.5 Improved Instrumentation 
In addition to minimization of sensor quantities, 
increased performance and robustness of existing 
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intrusive sensors and associated connectors and 
wiring/cables can be enhanced.  Instruments, 
connectors, and wiring that can withstand long 
durations of extreme conditions in all phases of 
operation are absolutely necessary for increased 
safety and reliability, quicker turn time, and lower 
operational costs.  
High accuracy, non-intrusive instrumentation is 
another area that can be developed to enhance full 
engine environment characterization while 
minimizing risks and operational concerns.  
3.6 EHMS-Supported Maintenance 
Scheduling 
The SLI program is supporting the development of 
engine health management systems (EHMS) to be 
part of the integrated vehicle health management 
(IVHM) system.  In addition to providing a 
reliability benefit provided by failure mode 
mitigation, the EHMS can be also used to support 
post-flight maintenance scheduling.  The data 
recorded by the EHMS during the engine flight 
operation can be downlinked to the ground for 
analysis.  This allows unscheduled maintenance to 
be identified and prepared for implementation 
before the vehicle returns to earth. 
4. Summary 
In the summer of 2002, NASA announced that it 
would not exercise the contract options to continue 
development of the COBRA or RS-83 engines.  
The suspension of development efforts was not 
due to technical or programmatic deficiencies in 
either project, but was due to reorientation of SLI 
priorities to focus on LOX/kerosene booster 
engine development.  With the limited program 
budget (and manpower), the LOX/LH2 
development effort could not be continued in 
parallel and was suspended. 
Although the LOX/LH2 engine programs were 
discontinued, they were useful in developing and 
demonstrating the process of infusing the strategic 
engine attributes (e.g., safety, reliability, 
operability, maintainability) into the engine design 
at an early stage.  This practice should be further 
refined and implemented in the design process of 
future engine development efforts. 
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